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Defendant's Right of Discovery in Criminal Cases
Bruce E. Gaynor*
To shackle counsel so that they cannot effectively seek out the
truth and afford the accused the representation which is not his
privilege but his absolute right seriously imperils our bedrock
presumption of innocence.'
E XPRESSING THIS COGENT ARGUMENT for broad discovery2 rights in
criminal cases is Justice William J. Brennan Jr.,3 dissenting in the
leading New Jersey case of State v. Tune.4
Predicated upon concepts of equity,5 discovery is the procedure by
which one litigant is enabled to force his opponent to make some or all
of his evidence available for examination. When authorized prior to
actual trial, such disclosure is termed "pre-trial discovery." I
The purpose of a trial is to ascertain the facts." Proponents of lib-
eral discovery assert that knowledge of the facts and, hence, discovery
are necessary for fundamental justice.9 They contend that adoption of
broad disclosure practices will eliminate the surprise and guesswork
from the courtroom,10 and transform the aura of a trial from a "sporting
event" to a "quest for truth." 11
In recent years, great strides toward broad discovery rights have
been made in the area of civil procedure. 12 Litigants in Ohio, for ex-
ample, are afforded inspection and copy of books, papers and other
* B.S. in Journalism, Bowling Green State University; Third-year student at Cleve-
land State University College of Law.
1 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A. 2d 881, 897 (1953).
2 The terms, "discovery" and "disclosure," will be used interchangeably throughout
this paper.
3 At the time of State v. Tune, Mr. Justice Brennan was a member of the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court. He was appointed Justice of the United States Supreme Court
in 1956, three years after the decision in Tune.
4 Supra, n. 1.
5 17 Am. Jur. 5 (1957).
6 Perkins, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law and Procedure 855 (1966).
7 Id.
8 Comment, Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 60 Yale L. J. 626 (1951).
9 See generally, Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 Stan. L. Rev.
293 (1960); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 Yale L. J. 1149 (1960); Editorial Note, Pretrial Criminal Discovery:
the Need for Expansion, 35 Cin. L. Rev. 195 (1966); Katz, Pretrial Discovery in Crim-
inal Cases, Crim. L. Bull. 5: 441 (Ohio 1969); Kranz, Pretrial Discovery In Criminal
Cases: A Necessity for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 Neb. L. Rev. 127 (1963); Tray-
nor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 228 (1964).
10 Sunderland, Foreword to Ragland, Discovery Before Trial iii (1932).
11 See, Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth, 1963
Wash. U. L. Q. 279 (1963).
12 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56
Cal. 2d 355, 364 P. 2d 266 (1961).
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documents containing evidence relating to the merits of the action or
defense in a civil suit.13 Such practices, it is purported, facilitate liti-
gation by narrowing the issues to be considered at trial, and causing
many other cases to be settled out of court. 14 Yet, despite the proven
success of liberal discovery in civil cases, 13 courts and legislatures have
been recalcitrant to extend this right to defendants in criminal causes. 16
The Ohio Revised Code, for example, provides that the rules of evi-
dence in civil causes, insofar as they are applicable, are controlling in
criminal causes.17 Nevertheless, Ohio courts have persistently refused
to interpret this statute (O.R.C. § 2945.41) as encompassing the right
to discovery.'8 It is argued that rights extended to a civil litigant should,
a fortiori, be extended to the criminally accused whose life and/or lib-
erty is at stake. 19
The injustice of the rule which limits or denies pre-trial discovery
rights to criminal defendants is apparent from an examination of the
facts in Tune: 20
In the early morning hours of August 24, 1952, John Henry Tune,
without the aid of counsel and surrounded by Newark police detectives,
confessed to the murder of William Prather. His statement was taken
down in what turned out to be a fourteen-page narrative.
Over two months later, the court appointed counsel to represent
Tune. He explained to them that he remembered signing something,
but was uncertain as to its contents. Counsel moved the trial court to
produce for the defendant's examination, inter alia, a copy of the afore-
mentioned statement. The trial judge allowed the motion for discovery,
on the grounds that it was "essential to elemental justice." 21 On ap-
peal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, however, that decision was
reversed. Chief Justice Vanderbilt, speaking for a four-to-three ma-
jority, reasoned that to allow pretrial discovery "lead[s] not to honest
fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury and suppression of evi-
dence." 22
The effect of this rationale, as Mr. Justice Brennan alluded to in
13 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.33.
14 Editorial Note, op. cit. supra n. 9.
15 Id. at 195.
16 See, Brennan, op. cit. supra n. 11 at 288.
17 Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.41.
18 State v. Corkran, 3 Ohio St. 2d 125, 209 N.E. 2d 437 (1965); State v. Yeoman, 112
Ohio St. 214, 147 N.E. 3 (1925); State v. Johnson, 57 Ohio L. Abs. 524, 94 N.E. 2d 791
(App., 1950); State v. Hahn, 10 Ohio Op. 29, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 449 (CP, 1937).
19 McCullough, The Right of Discovery in Criminal Cases, or the Lack Thereof Un-
der Ohio Law, 44 Ohio Op. 175 (1968).
20 Supra, n. 1.
21 Id., at 897.
22 Id., at 884.
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his dissent,23 is that "our bedrock presumption of innocence" is im-
periled. If the defendant were presumed to be innocent, as the law
provides, then there would be little reason to anticipate perjury, wit-
ness-tampering and suppression of evidence. The result is that defense
counsel must fight in the dark, without adequate knowledge essential to
the proper preparation of the defense.
In his opinion denying defendant Tune the right to disclosure of
evidence in possession of the prosecution, the Chief Justice cited State v.
Rhoads, 24 an Ohio case, as authority for the rule. In that case, Justice
Price stated:
The state cannot compel the prisoner at the bar to submit his
private papers or memoranda to the state for use or even examina-
tion, for he cannot be required to testify in the case, nor to furnish
evidence against himself. Then why should the accused be allowed
to rummage through the private papers of the prosecuting attorney?
Neither the sublime teachings of the Golden Rule to which we
have been referred, nor the supposed sense of fair play, can be so
perverted as to sanction the demands allowed in this case.25
Despite such contentions in established case law, advocates of
liberal discovery practices in criminal causes rely on the premise that
the balance of advantage in any criminal trial rests with the prosecu-
tion,20 which usually has extensive financial and manpower resources
at its disposal. The argument for the supporters of the rule, however,
is that the accused is protected from discovery by the prosecution by
virtue of the Fifth Amendment,27 and that discovery should be a re-
ciprocal right.28 Although some proponents of discovery reform would
allow some reciprocity, others are reluctant to make such concessions.2 9
The recent recognition by the United States Supreme Court of the
right of the accused to be apprised of his rights,30 to have counsel pro-
vided when he is indigent, 31 and to be protected against unreasonable
searches and seizures,32 is of little avail when he cannot even discover
evidence to be used against him where it is essential to the preparation
of his defense. Based upon the premise that the adversary system
23 Id. at 894.
24 81 Ohio St. 397, 91 N.E. 186 (1910).
25 Id. at 425.
26 See Goldstein, op. cit. supra n. 9 at 1180-1199.
27 U.S. Const., amend. V, provides in part that "... nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself ... " See also, Jones v. Superior Court,
58 Cal. 2d 56, 69, 372 P. 2d 919, 927 (1962).
28 Supra n. 24.
29 McCullough, op. cit. supra n. 19 at 175.
30 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
31 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
32 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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elicits justice, current limited discovery practice is predicated upon
the legal fiction that all counsel are equally competent. 33 Advocates of
change assert that due process of law cannot be realized in a proceeding
which merely places one attorney's research abilities and powers of
oral advocacy against another's. Such is a mere sporting event, as
opposed to a quest for truth. The need for knowledge is apparent.
History
The avant-garde for broad discovery rights in criminal trials
often assert that the general rule limiting disclosure was born in the
"vestiges of trial by combat." 34 Perhaps the earliest known English
case on the subject, King v. Holland,35 was heard in 1792. In that case,
Lord Kenyon denied the defendant's motion for pre-trial discovery,
promulgating that "there is no principle or precedent to warrant it." 30
He concluded that the granting of such rights would indeed "subvert
the whole system of criminal law." 31
One of the first American cases dealing with pre-trial discovery
rights of the accused was the famous case of United States v. Burr,3s
where Chief Justice Marshall held that a letter, being relevant to the
defense, could not fairly be withheld from Aaron Burr, the defendant.
In 1923, Judge Learned Hand found little merit in the force of
Marshall's opinion, in United States v. Garsson,39 where he denied the
accused certain discovery rights on the basis that the balance of ad-
vantage in criminal trials rests with the accused, and to grant discovery
rights would be to add to the imbalance.
40
Four years later, in the 1927 case of People ex rel. Lemon v. Su-
preme Court,4 1 Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the majority in that
New York Court of Appeals case, foresaw "the beginnings or at least the
glimmerings" of expansion in the area of criminal discovery.
Two Ohio cases which have established long-lasting precedent in
the area of pre-trial discovery in criminal cases are State v. Rhoads
42
and State v. Yeoman.
43
33 See generally, Traynor, op. cit. supra n. 9.
34 Comment, op. cit. supra n. 8 at 626.
35 100 Eng. Rep. 1240 (K.B., 1792).
36 Id. at 1249.
37 Id.
38 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
39 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y., 1923).
40 Id. at 649.
41 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
42 Supra, n. 24.
43 112 Ohio St. 214, 147 N.E. 3 (1925).
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The former case, decided in 1910, was sound authority in this state
for nearly sixty years. Counsel for the defendant in this criminal prose-
cution moved that the trial judge order the prosecuting attorney to
produce (1) a transcript of an interview with a witness who was later
called and examined before the grand jury and (2) minutes of evi-
dence taken before the grand jury. Justice Price held that the tran-
script of the interview was not "evidence" but private "memoranda"
of the prosecutor.44 Reasoning that discovery of this record would be
a "search and seizure" of the prosecutor's private notes, the Justice dis-
tinguished the case where the witness reads from the notes while on
the witness stand. In the latter case, the statements would become part
of the cross-examination and, hence, subject to inspection.
As to the second issue, Justice Price held that the Revised Statutes 45
required secrecy in grand jury proceedings and that evidence before
the grand jury is not discoverable. The defendant has no absolute right
to be present at the grand jury proceedings, his rights being adequately
safeguarded by the presentment of the indictment which specifies the
nature of the charge, and the elements to be proved for a conviction.
Adhering to the "sporting event" concept of criminal prosecutions, the
Justice espoused the theory that "it is a contest between the people and
the criminals for the mastery." 46
The right of a defendant to inspect his own written confession was
treated in the case of State v. Yeoman.47 . In this case before the Ohio
Supreme Court, the defendant was indicted on a charge of murder.
After his arraignment, but prior to trial, his counsel moved the trial
court for an order directing the prosecuting attorney to allow them
the right to inspect and copy Yeoman's signed confession. The trial
judge sustained the motion and the prosecuting attorney brought ex-
ceptions. Reversing the lower court's decision, the highest Ohio court
called the Rhoads decision "analogous." Neither G.C. § 11552 nor G.C.
§ 13664, the court held, required such inspection by the defendant. The
former statute allows for inspection of "evidence" in civil trials and
the latter makes certain rules of evidence in civil cases applicable to
criminal causes. As in the Rhoads decision, however, the court reiter-
ated the rule that when a document is offered into evidence, or if the
prosecuting attorney should examine a witness in relation to such a
document, the defendant gains the right to discover the same.
The decisions in Rhoads and Yeoman dealt only with pre-trial re-
quests for discovery of confessions, grand jury minutes and statements
which are part of the prosecutor's "work product." As a result, their
44 Supra n. 24 at 409.
45 O.R.C. § 7195, 7190.
46 Supra n. 24 at 425.
47 Supra, n. 43.
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holdings left much room for speculation and interpretation as to other
forms of evidence.
In 1929, in State v. Lewis, 48 the Court of Common Pleas had oc-
casion to interpret the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Yeoman.
Lewis, in the former case, was indicted for forgery and, so as to allow
him to better prepare his defense, the trial court allowed discovery
privileges with regard to the alleged forged documents. The lower
court explained and distinguished the Supreme Court's holding on the
basis that a new statute, G.C. § 13444-149, superseded that statute in
Yeoman, G.C. § 13664.50 The latter, it should be noted, made "certain"
civil rules applicable to criminal cases, the "certain" rules being rather
strictly defined. It was held that discovery was not one of those "cer-
tain" rules to be applied to crimnial cases. The former statute, however,
was an enlargement over G.C. § 13664 in that it did not specify "certain"
rules, but rather provided that rules of evidence in civil causes would
control in criminal causes "where applicable." This new statute was,
indeed, an expansion of those rules which could be applied to criminal
cases.
Other decisions following Rhoads and Yeoman illustrate the in-
definiteness of any rule. In the same year as Lewis, for example, the
Ohio Court of Appeals refused to apply the rationale of Lewis in the
case of Arnold v. State.5 1 Likewise, in State v. Hahn,5 2 the Court of
Appeals affirmed a judgment denying the accused the right to inspect
all documents in possession of the prosecuting attorney. The court
held that the trial court has no authority to grant such a motion until
the statements are offered into evidence, and that the Ohio Code of
Civil Procedure has no applicability to criminal trials in the area of
discovery.
In dictum in the 1938 case of State v. Fox,5 3 the Ohio Supreme
Court further clouded the issue of criminal disclosure by stating what
was an apparent contradiction of some of the prior cases. In a prosecu-
tion for chicken-stealing, three individuals were tried as codefendants.
48 27 N.P. (n.s.) 460 (CP, 1929).
49 Gen. Code of Ohio § 13444-1 (now Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.41) reads: "Rules appli-
cable in criminal cases. The rules of evidence in civil causes insofar as the same
are applicable, shall govern in all criminal causes except as otherwise provided in
this code."
50 Gen. Code § 13664 (later G.C. § 13444-6 and now Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.46) reads
"How attendance to be enforced. Except as otherwise provided, the code of civil
procedure relative to compelling the attendance and testimony of witnesses, their
examination, the administering of oaths and affirmations and proceedings for con-
tempt to enforce the remedies and protect the rights of parties, shall extend to crim-
inal cases as far as applicable."
51 33 Ohio App. 185, 168 N.E. 848 (1929).
52 10 Ohio Op. 29, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 449 (C.P., 1937).
53 133 Ohio St. 154, 12 N.E. 2d 413 (1938).
Jan. 1971
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss1/57
DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES
In delivering the opinion, the court remarked in passing that the de-
fendant could have evoked the provisions of G.C. § 13444-1 (now R.C.
§ 2945.41) and discovered the confession of one of the codefendants. The
court's statement, in effect, was a reaffirmance of the ruling in State v.
Lewis, supra.
Again, in a 1940 case before the Ohio Court of Appeals, Yeoman and
Fox were gently cast aside, and a new interpretation of pre-trial dis-
closure evinced. Here, in State v. Cala,5 4 the question was posed wheth-
er defendants were entitled to inspection as a matter of "absolute right."
Discounting Yeoman as the old rule, established under a superseded
statute,55 and rejecting Fox (and, in effect, Lewis) as mere dicta not
carried over into the syllabus, the court recognized the power of dis-
cretion in the trial judge. Assuming, arguendo, that the civil rules of
evidence were applicable to criminal cases, the court interpreted the
term "may order" in the provision for civil discovery as being dis-
cretionary and not absolute.
The Ohio Law Today
Today, sixty years after the decision in Rhoads and forty-five years
after Yeoman, Ohio courts now afford the criminally accused some de-
gree of pre-trial discovery by virtue of the recently-enacted discovery
deposition statute. R.C. § 2945.5056 provides that either the defendant
or the prosecution may apply to the court for permission to take the
deposition of any witness in a criminal case. The statute is permis-
sive,57 and places Ohio in the foreground as one of a few states with
discovery deposition provisions that place so much discretion in the trial
judge."' Proponents of broad discovery practice claim that this statute
is a giant step toward more liberal disclosure rights, as it frees the
Ohio criminal process from its hunter-hunted quality.59
In State ex rel. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga
County,30 the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the statute's constitu-
tionality, and stated that "civil guidelines are available to the presiding
54 20 Ohio Op. 400, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 97, 35 N.E. 2d 758 (App., 1940).
55 Supra, n. 50.
56 Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.50 provides that "At any time after an issue of fact is joined
upon an indictment, information, or an affidavit, the prosecution or the defendant
may apply in writing to the court in which such indictment, information, or affidavit
is pending for a commission to take the depositions of any witness. The court or a
judge thereof may grant such commission and make an order stating in what man-
ner and for what length of time notice shall be given to the prosecution or to the
defendant, before such witness shall be examined."
57 McCullough, op. cit. supra n. 19 at 178.
58 Ratnoff, The New Criminal Deposition Statute in Ohio-Help or Hindrance to Jus-
tice, 19 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 279 at 281 (1968).
59 Id.
60 9 Ohio St. 2d 159, 224 N.E. 2d 906 (1967).
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judge in the trial of criminal causes." 61 The court also stated that the
judge is "clothed with the same discretion as is the judge in a civil
cause."62 As a result of Jackman, the gap between civil and criminal
practices was narrowed.
Still, despite this legislative and judicial step towards broader dis-
covery rights through the use of depositions, other areas of criminal
discovery continue to lag behind. The courts have come a long way
since Rhoads and Yeoman, but much of the law remains nebulous and
badly in need of judicial elucidation. It is well-settled that there is no
absolute right to pre-trial discovery in Ohio criminal cases. State v.
Laskey,6 3 a 1970 case before the Ohio Supreme Court provides a cur-
rent statement of the rule:
It is also well settled that the allowance or overruling of various
discovery motions in a criminal case rests within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court, and only in cases of clear abuse will that
discretion be disturbed upon review. 4
Recognition of discretionary power in the trial judge, however, is
not new. In 1940, State v. Cala,6 5 enunciated that same rule, and in
1963 in the case of State v. Hill,', a Court of Common Pleas announced
guidelines by which it would vest its discretionary power. The accused
must file affidavits, according to the court, stating that he cannot recall
the contents of statements made by him, and must make such request
seasonably before trial. Again, in 1965, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that the right of a defendant to inspect his own statements lies in the
discretion of the trial judge.67
Despite the seeming "discretionary power" of the trial court, there
is no statutory authority nor a rule requiring the prosecutor to permit
the defendant or his counsel to examine statements or confessions. As
stated in State v. White:
A defendant in a felony case does not have the right to inspect
and copy or examine statements or confessions of his or of other
witnesses and documents or property in possession of the prose-
cution, unless upon the trial on the merits such evidence is used
by the prosecution in such a way as to make such statement or
property an issue in the case or unless such evidence or property is
of such a character that to keep it from the knowledge of the de-
fendant would constitute the denial of a fair trial.6s
61 Id. at 167.
62 Id. at 168.
63 21 Ohio St. 2d 187, 50 Ohio Op. 2d 432 (1970).
64 Id. at 188.
65 Supra n. 54.
66 23 Ohio Op. 2d 255, 91 Ohio L. Abs. 125, 191 N.E. 2d 235 (C.P., 1963).
67 State v. Corkran, 3 Ohio St. 2d 125, 209 N.E. 2d 437 (1965).
68 95 Ohio App. 2d 271, 38 Ohio Op. 2d 330 (1967).
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On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court 9 however, this Court of
Appeals decision, based upon rationale in Yeoman and Rhoads, was
qualified so as to allow the defendant the right to an in camera7" pro-
ceeding to determine whether or not inconsistencies exist between a
witness's testimony at the trial and his pre-trial statements. To this
extent, part one of the syllabus in State v. Rhoads was overruled.
Though the decision in White does little for the accused's pre-trial
discovery rights, it was indeed an iconoclastic step for the Ohio Supreme
Court in shedding some of its antipathy for disclosure of state's evi-
dence. An interesting feature of the White case is the fact that the
court placed some reliance on the United States Supreme Court de-
cision in Jencks v. United States,7 1 where the high court held that
the defendant was entitled to inspect reports made to the F.B.I. by
two government witnesses who had testified at the trial. Much broader
in its scope, however, the decision in Jencks held that the accused was
entitled to obtain the witnesses' reports where it appeared that their
testimony at the trial related to matters contained in the reports.
Though, as in White, the discovery was for the purpose of impeaching
witnesses, Jencks held that the defendant was not required to lay a
foundation showing inconsistencies between the witnesses' pre-trial
reports and statements made on the witness stand.
Ohio decisions prior to White held, as a general rule, that the de-
fendant had no right to inspect statements of state's witnesses or re-
ports until they were offered into evidence,7 2 or used by witnesses while
testifying at trial.73 Similarly, it was held in State v. Sharp7 4 that the
defendant was entitled to discover his own confession or statement if
the object of the prosecutor's questioning related to or around such
confession or statements in his cross-examination of the defendant.
Perhaps the most blatant repression of pre-trial right of the crim-
inally accused concerns the refusal of the courts to hold that R.C.
§2317.3375, (formerly G.C. §11552 under Yeoman decision), which
provides for disclosure of books, papers and documents, is applicable
to criminal causes by virtue of R.C. § 2945.21 (formerly G.C. § 13444-1).
The rule holding that civil discovery rules of evidence were not ap-
69 State v. White, 15 Ohio St. 2d 146, 239 N.E. 2d 65 (1968).
70 "In chambers; in private. A cause is said to be in camera when the hearing is had
before the judge in his private room or when all spectators are excluded from the
courtroom." Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition (1951).
71 353 U.S. 657 (1956).
72 Supra n. 24.
73 See Dayton v. Thomas, 118 Ohio App. 165, 193 N.E. 2d 521 (1963); State v. Strain,
84 Ohio App. 229, 82 N.E. 2d 109 (1948).
74 162 Ohio St. 173, 122 N.E. 2d 684 (1954). Compare State v. Miller, 88 Ohio L. Abs.
533, 176 N.E. 2d 296 (App. 1961); State v. Thomasson, 46 Ohio Op. 402, 97 N.E. 2d 42
(App. 1950).
75 Supra n. 49.
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plicable to criminal cases, as mentioned supra, was based upon a super-
seded statute,76 yet the new, broader statute continues to be construed
under the same rationale as the older statute. This, despite the fact
that the Ohio Supreme Court said, in dicta, that the civil rules were
applicable to criminal trials.77 In State v. Corkran,78 a 1965 case, the
Ohio Supreme Court said that the former, more liberal, rule was not
carried over into the syllabus and, therefore, not binding as precedent.
The result of these varied and seemingly irreconcilable positions was
the vesting of discretion in the trial judge-a discretion which, more
often than not, is a discretionary "no" as opposed to a discretionary
''yes.")
Conclusion
Despite the seemingly multifarious safeguards now afforded the
criminally accused by virtue of Escobedo,7 9 Miranda,80 Gideon8 l and
MappS2-to name only a few-one who is in jeopardy of losing life, lib-
erty and property is still left to wallow about in the darkness with only
an indictment or a bill of particulars upon which to base his defense.
Furthermore, his right to be apprised of the evidence against him is
denied upon unstable grounds: First, that the accused may be guilty
and, hence, discovery might tempt him to perform illegal acts to vindi-
cate himself. Second, that a battle of wits in the courtroom between the
adversaries will usually elicit justice. Both of these bases are poor
grounds upon which to deny the defendant the right to be adequately
informed as to the evidence against him.
In Ohio, the judiciary and/or the legislature must act to reform
the current practice which limits the accused's right of discovery. In so
doing, to be sure, it would not be treading upon untried ground. Cali-
fornia, a leading state in criminal discovery rights, has already ven-
tured into the area and, from all indications, has not been unsuccessful.S3
The right of the accused in that state has been extended to allow dis-
covery of confessions and recordings in possession of the prosecution;S4
and the virtually untouched area of reciprocal discovery by the state
76 Supra n. 50.
77 Supra n. 53.
78 Supra n. 67.
79 Supra n. 30.
80 Id.
81 Supra n. 31.
82 Supra n. 32.
83 See Vance v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 92, 330 P. 2d 773 (1958); Powell v. Supe-
rior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P. 2d 698 (1957).
84 Id.
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has also been explored in California.8 5 Even in England, where the
rule allowing limited discovery originated, the rights of the accused
to disclosure have been made much more broad.86 And under military
law, so often referred to as eliciting a "harsh" form of justice, the
accused has broad rights in discovering the evidence against him.87
The alternatives to the rule currently in force in this state are
not Utopian. To be sure, any liberalization of the rule might have the
consequences of freeing a few who should not be free, and hindering the
prosecutor in developing a expeditious case for the State. This will al-
ways be the case, however, where civil liberties lay in the balance.
Sometimes a criminal must walk the streets so that the innocent do
not suffer at the hands of overbroad and sweeping laws.
What are the alternatives to restrictive discovery practices? A
discretionary power in the court might serve, in one alternative, as
a check upon misuse of a liberal discovery rule. That is, it might be
possible for the courts to extend discovery privileges to all persons as
a matter of right, with the one qualification that if, perhaps, a "clear
and present danger" would result from the exercise of discovery in
a given case, the judge could vest his discretion to control any pos-
sible misuse or abuse of the right.
A second alternative is an "absolute" approach to the problem.
Discovery, like the right to counsel, would be an absolute right of the
defendant in a criminal cause. This practice would allow for no dis-
cretionary power in the trial judge except as mentioned in the next
paragraph.
In either of these alternatives, any and all evidence relevant to
the defense would be made available. The determination of relevancy
would be reserved to an in camera proceeding. At that proceeding, the
trial judge would determine if there is the slightest relevancy to the
case and, if so, he would grant discovery. Only in cases where the
discovery would in no way relate to the case would he exercise his
discretionary or veto power. The discoverable area would include de-
fendant's statements, statements of government witnesses who will testi-
fy at the trial or who have testified at the grand jury proceedings, copies
of the minutes of the grand jury, evidence presented to the grand jury,
tests performed by the government, official reports of the state, names
and addresses of witnesses and any other evidence relevant to the
preparation of the defense.
85 See Brennan, op. cit. supra n. 11 at 283.
86 Id. at 284.
87 See, U.S. Military Justice on Trial, LXXVI, No. 9 Newsweek Magazine 22 (August
31, 1970) for comment that military pre-trial investigatory procedure is a "lawyer's
dream."
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In State v. Rhoads, the prosecution stated in its brief:
Perhaps in some far off Utopia the day may come when counsel
for the state and counsel for the defendant engaged in trial will
co-operate in a spirit of mutual fairness and candor to assist each
other in presenting their respective sides of the case.88
And counsel for the defense replied:
A consummation devoutly to be wished.8 9
88 Supra n. 24 at 398.
89 Id. at 403.
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